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WHAT IF MARY SUE WANTED AN
ABORTION INSTEAD?
THE EFFECT OF DAVIS v. DAVIS ON
ABORTION RIGHTS
CHRISTINA L. MISNER*
Scenario One: In Tennessee, Mr. Smith is upset.1 He and his wife
have been attempting for years to have a child. However, now that
the advanced technology of "in vitro fertilization"2 has provided seven
frozen preembryos' with which they may realize their parenting
dream, their marriage is irreconcilable. After the divorce, Mr. Smith
wants nothing to do with Mrs. Smith. He does not want children with
her, and he abhors the idea of her having his biological children
without him as the father figure. In short, Mr. Smith does not want
the preembryos to be born. He would rather destroy them than
become a father against his Will.
How does Mr. Smith solve his problem? He sues Mrs. Smith for
custody of the preembryos if she refuses to relinquish them. To
bolster his argument, Mr. Smith will cite the Tennessee Supreme
* Associate with sole practitioner in Takoma, Washington. J.D., University of Puget Sound
School of Law (now Seattle University School of Law), 1994; BA., Indiana University, 1990.
1. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *21 (Blount County Cir.
Ct. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989) (reciting the facts on which this hypothetical is based).
2. See Note, Developments in the Law: Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1519, 1537-38,1542 (1990) (citingANDRFA BONNIcKSEN, INVITRO FERTILIZATION 147-51 (1989))
("In vitro fertilization involves removing a ripe egg from a woman's body and combining that
egg with sperm in a petri dish. If fertilization occurs, the fertilized egg is permitted to divide
until it is multicellular and is then implanted into a woman's womb .... 'Frozen embryos' [are]
fertilized but unimplanted human eggs.").
3. SeeDavis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *13 n.11 (Blount County
Cir. Ct. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989) (defining "preembryo" as a human entity that exists during a
fourteen day period of development before the egg attaches to the uterine wall). Although no
organs are developed and no cells are differentiated in a preembryo, genetics are "locked in"
at fertilization. I& at *13-14. For purposes of this note, the terms "preembryo" and "embryo"
are used interchangeably. The difference between these two stages of development was a source
of heated debate between experts at the trial court level of Davis, the subject of this article. Id.
at *21. Ultimately, this difference was found to be irrelevant in deciding the issues of the case.
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tenn. 1992).
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Court decision of Davis v. Davis,4 which supports his fundamental
right not to procreate. If the court recognizes that Mr. Smith's right
not to procreate outweighs Mrs. Smith's affirmative right to procreate,
the preembryos will be destroyed.
Scenario Two: Only a few blocks from the Smith household, Mrs.
Jones is fuming. She stares at a pregnancy test, considering her
predicament: not only is she on the verge of a nasty divorce, but she
is pregnant as well. Mrs. Jones is positive her husband is the father;
she is also sure their marriage is doomed, due in part to his infidelity
and violent inclinations. Knowing her husband as she does, Mrs.
Jones is certain he will want to keep the child. She is equally certain
that she will be the one faced with any resulting medical concerns,
economic hardships, and loneliness. Mrs. Jones definitely does not
want to have this child, whose father she considers a monster. She is
also worried that it might end up with Mr. Jones and his future wife
as custodial parents. In short, Mrs. Jones wants an abortion because
she does not wish to procreate with Mr. Jones.
The solution to Mrs. Jones' dilemma is more complicated than the
solution to Mr. Smith's dilemma. According to the Tennessee
Criminal Abortion Statute, Mrs. Jones must have an abortion before
the fetus becomes viable, preferably during the first three months of
pregnancy.5 If she waits until the fetus becomes viable, her physician
must certify in writing that an abortion is necessary to preserve her
life or her health.6 Even if Mrs. Jones decides to have an abortion
before the fetus reaches viability, she cannot do so immediately. She
must first prove that she is a Tennessee resident.' Second, she must
ari-ange to have the abortion performed by a licensed physician.8 In
addition, the physician may not perform the abortion until Mrs.
Jones' "informed written consent" is obtained.9 Consent is "in-
formed" only if Mrs. Jones listens to her doctor explicitly tell her the
4. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588.
5. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201(c) (1)-(2) (1991) (stating that it is not a crime to have an
abortion during the first three months of pregnancy if the woman consents and her licensed
physician concurs with her decision). The statute further states it is not a crime to have an
abortion after the first three months of pregnancy if the fetus is not viable, the woman consents,
and the procedure is performed in a licensed hospital by the woman's licensed physician. Id
6. Id. § 39-15-201(c) (3) (requiring the physician to provide such certification to both the
District Attorney General and the hospital wherein the abortion will be performed).
7. I& § 39-15-201(d) (mandating proof of residency satisfactory to the performing
physician).
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201(c) (1) (1991) (requiring a licensed physician to approve
a woman's decision to abort during the first three months of pregnancy); see also id. § 63-6-201
(establishing general licensing requirements for Tennessee physicians).
9. Id. § 39-15-202(a) (requiringawoman's consentbe "given freelyandwithoutcoercion").
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benefits and risks of abortion.'" The physician then explains the
advantages and disadvantages of the procedure to the best of his or
her ability, given the particular woman's circumstances." After this
consultation, Mrs.Jones must wait two days; on the third day following
her physician's warnings, she is eligible to sign the consent form and
have an abortion. 2
A comparison of these two scenarios leads to the logical question:
why would the law be so quick to recognize a man's right to refrain
from procreation, but be so reluctant to recognize the same right for
a woman contemplating abortion? This article explores the discrepan-
cy, which becomes apparent when one reads Davis v. Davis" together
with the current leading abortion case, Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
em Pennsylvania v. Casey. 4 These two cases treat the fundamental
right to privacy in significantly different ways."5 However, both cases
present the same personal question: whether an individual has the
freedom to make up his or her own mind about whether to have a
child.'6 After analyzing the fundamental right to procreational
autonomy, the freedom of bodily integrity, and a woman's right to
abortion, this article calls upon the U.S. Supreme Court to apply the
10. Id § 39-15-202(b) (l)-(5) (asserting that "truly informed consent" occurs only after a
woman listens to her doctor's oral recitation of the dangers associated with abortion).
11. Id. § 39-15-202(b) (6) (requiring the physician to address potential individual concerns
related to childbirth and/or abortion).
12. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-202(d) (1) (1991) ("There shall be a two (2) day waiting
period after the physician provides the required information, excluding the day on which such
information was given. On the third day following the day such information was given, the
patient may return to the physician and sign a consent form.").
13. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
14. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). For further discussions concerning Casey's impact on a woman's
right to abort, see generallyJon D. Anderson, Abortion: State Regulation-Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), 76 MARQ. L. REv. 317 (1992) (setting forth
Casey's facts and procedural posture, evaluating each opinion in the case, and proposing
alternative approaches the Supreme Court could have utilized); Kathryn Kolbert & David H.
Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v. Casey: Establishing Neutrality Principles in State
Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 1151 (1993) (suggesting that principles of state neutrality
should be utilized to provide women greater constitutional protection in the post-Casey world);
Paul B. Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The lightfrom Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST.
LouIs U. PUB. L. REv. 15 (1993) (arguing that, realistically, Casey overruled Roe v. Wade).
15. Compare Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820 (holding that a woman's right to privacy and, by
extension, her procreational autonomy as manifested in her right to obtain an abortion, is not
fundamental and may be regulated so long as the regulations do not constitute an undue
burden) with Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04 (supporting the preembryos' parents' "right to sole
decisional authority as to whether the process of attempting to gestate these preembryos should
continue" and holding that where the parents' wishes conflict, "the party wishing to avoid
procreation should prevail").
16. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804 (recognizing and reaffirming a woman's right to obtain an
abortion before viability); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598 (asserting that the "essential dispute.., is
... whether the parties will become parents").
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reasoning adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v.
Davis7 to future abortion cases.
I. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S VIEWS ON PROCREATiVE LIBERTY
Though the word "privacy" does not appear expressly within its text,
a citizen's right to privacy is nonetheless deeply rooted within those
rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution." The Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits states from enacting laws that "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 9 The Due
Process Clause protects not only those rights explicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution, but also implied rights,2" including an individual's
right to privacy.21 The right to privacy is considered a necessary
substantive extension of those liberty interests guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,22 and encompasses
both the affirmative right to procreate23 and the right to prevent
procreation. 24 "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."25 For
pregnant women, abortion implicates not only procreational rights,
but also rights accorded to bodily integrity, namely the right to be left
alone. "No right is held more sacred, [n] or is more carefully guarded
... than the right of every individual to the possession and control of
17. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
18. SeeGriswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-84 (1965) (asserting thatprior precedents
recognize peripheral rights--"penumbras"--not mentioned specifically in the Bill of Rights,
including the right to privacy). The Court in Griswold cited Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), among others, as supporting the
legitimacy of peripheral rights. Id. at 482-83.
19. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805 (quotingJustice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 543 (1961) as support for the proposition that liberty is not limited to the specific
protections contained in the Bill of Rights); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg,J., concurring)
("[Liberty] is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights.").
21. Griswold; 381 U.S. at 484-86 (describing the origins and controversies regarding the right
to privacy).
22. Id. at 482-83 (asserting that the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights would be less
secure in the absence of "peripheral rights").
23. SeeSkinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (holding that the liberty interest includes the right to raise children).
24. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992) ("[T]he right of procreational
autonomy is composed of two rights of equal significance-the right to procreate and the right
to avoid procreation.").
25. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
564 (1969); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905)).
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his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others
1,26
Decisions about procreation must be free from state intrusion
because such decisions implicate fundamental rights. States may
not create obstacles designed to prohibit the exercise of fundamental
rights.28 Therefore, regulations that burden procreational decisions
are subject to strict scrutiny by courts.29 Such regulations can
withstand strict scrutiny only if they exist for a "compelling state
interest," and are "narrowly tailored" to achieve that interest.3  In
other words, regulations infringing upon fundamental rights,
including the right to privacy, do not enjoy the same presumption of
validity as laws that do not infringe on fundamental rights.3 The
state "carr[ies] a heavy burden of justification" when courts subject
statutes to strict scrutiny.32 The 1977 U.S. Supreme Court case of
Carey v. Population Services International treated procreation as a
fundamental right by applying strict scrutiny to regulations imposing
burdens on procreational decisions.33
Even U.S. Supreme Court Justice O'Connor, who has reluctantly
recognized the right to privacy in abortion cases, admitted that
26. Union Pac. Ry.v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,251 (1891) (denying that the circuit court had
the power to order a personal injury plaintiff to submit to a surgical examination); contra
Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 11 (1941) (holding that FED. R. Civ. P. 35, which empowers a
court to order a party to submit to a mental or physical examination, is valid).
27. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977) (holding that access to
contraceptives is an essential component of the right to make procreational decisions);
Eisenstadt; 405 U.S. at 453 (stressing the importance of freedom from governmental regulations
regarding decisions about parenthood); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 540 (noting the importance of
marriage and procreation to the human race's survival); Dawn E.Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal
Rights: Confiicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE
LJ. 599, 617-18 (1986) ("Protection against state intrusion afforded by the Constitution is
especially strong where issues of childbearing are involved.").
28. Johnsen, supra note 27, at 617-18 (asserting that both direct state intrusion in or
interference with personal decision-making autonomy are prohibited).
29. For a general description of strict scrutiny, see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973) (evaluating a challenge to Texas' method of financing public
education). The Court stated that "strict scrutiny means the state's system is not entitied to the
usual presumption of validity, that the State rather than the complainants must carry a 'heavy
burden ofjustification'[.]" Id.
30. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,155 (1973); Eisenstadt 405 U.S.
at 463).
31. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16 (noting that Texas' system of financing public education was
not likely to withstand strict judicial scrutiny).
32. Id.
33. 431 U.S. at 686 ("Where a decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a
child is involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling state
interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests.").
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choices regarding procreation require sound constitutional protection
against governmental imposition.' Justice O'Connor stated in Casey
[These] matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life.35
Decisions regarding procreative liberty, abortion, and access to
contraception should not be viewed as separate and distinct catego-
ries, but rather as three overlapping spheres. Access to each specific
right is essential if the right to privacy in the larger sense is to be
protected. 6
II. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S VIEWS ON ABORTION
The fundamental right to have an abortion evolves from the right
to privacy, including: (1) the right to "personal autonomy and bodily
integrity,"37 and (2) the right to make one's own procreational
choices." In 1973, the much-heralded Roe v. Wade decision first
established abortion as within the fundamental constitutional right to
privacy.' As a result, the Supreme Court has not hesitated in the
past to strike down statutes infringing upon women's access to
abortion." However, many fear that the more recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services41 and Casey42
34. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992); see
David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between Justice
O'Connor and Justice Scalia Over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 895, 923(1993) (citing Casey in support of the proposition that Justice O'Connor's approach to
unenumerated fundamental rights yields politically conservative results).
35. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
36. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688-89 (arguing that there is no constitutionally significant distinction
between regulations severely inhibiting a woman's ability to obtain an abortion and regulations
prohibiting abortion altogether).
37. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810.
38. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-
42 (1942)).
39. Id. at 154 ("We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the
abortion decision .... ").
40. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983)
(striking down those statutory provisions mandating twenty-four hour waiting periods before
abortions, informed consent, the requirement thatsecond-trimester abortions be performed only
in hospitals, and rules regarding disposal of fetal remains); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo.
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69, 75-79 (1976) (holding that the state may not constitutionally
require spousal consent or prohibit the abortion method known as saline amniocentesis); Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195-200 (1973) (striking down as "unduly restrictive" a statute requiring:
(1) abortions be performed only at accredited hospitals; (2) approval of the abortion decision
by an abortion committee and two other physicians; and (3) that the patient be a state resident).
41. 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989) (narrowing and modifying Roe).
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represent a deterioration of procreational autonomy. ,The court in
Davis itself recognized that procreational protection by the courts "is
no longer entirely clear."' Justice Blackmun best articulated this
fear in his dissent to the Webster plurality: "[the plurality] turns a
stone face to anyone in search of what [it] conceives as the scope of
a woman's right under the Due Process Clause to terminate a
pregnancy free from the coercive and brooding influence of the
State." 4
Procreational autonomy indeed does not stand inviolate.45 There
are two ways in which the Supreme Court's abortion cases have
deviated from the individual's fundamental right to make procreation-
al decisions. First, most cases attempt to establish a point before
which a woman may seek an abortion without fear of state regula-
tion.46 After that point, the right to abortion is not guaranteed.47
Second, some cases distinguish themselves by the heightened weight
given to states' interests in protecting both the woman's health and
the potential life of the unborn.' s Depending upon the interests
articulated by the state, a court will apply either strict or intermediate
scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the regulations in
question.49  As a result, the right to have an abortion is never
completely free from regulation of the abortion process.5"
42. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804, 2817, 2820 (1992) (reaffirming the central holding of Roe as
being the woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability, yet upholding the state's
right to regulate abortions even before viability).
43. 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in
Webster).
44. 492 U.S. at 538 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
45. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816-21 (discussing the appropriateness of state regulations
limiting a woman's ability to exercise her right to an abortion); see also Kolbert & Gans, supra
note 14, at 1151 (addressing the changing constitutional analyses applied to the right to
privacy).
46. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (holding that a state may not prohibit abortion before
viability but may do so after viability); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 433 (1983) (reaffirming Roe's distinction between the first and second
trimesters of pregnancy); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,61, 63-65
(1976) (reaffirming Rods trimester distinctions and extensively discussing viability).
47. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (holding that abortion may be proscribed after viability).
48. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 519-20 (upholding the portion of a statute requiring viability
testing prior to an abortion as furthering the state's interest in protecting potential human life);
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75-79 (reversing a lower court's holding that concern for maternal health
justified prohibiting the saline amniocentesis abortion method).
49. Compare Ro, 410 U.S. at 155 (asserting that states must have compelling interests to
justify laws infringing upon fundamental tights) with Danforth, 428 U.S. at 66 (articulating an
intermediate standard of review by searching for a legitimate-as distinguished from a
compelling-state interest to justify a consent requirement).
50. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816-21 (holding that abortion regulations which do not
constitute an undue burden are constitutional).
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The landmark case of Roe v. Wade fell short of recognizing a
sweeping right to abortion for women desiring not to procreate.51
Roe held that the right to privacy encompasses a woman's decision
whether to terminate her own pregnancy; however, this right can be
restricted.52 It can be overcome by compelling state interests, such
as protection of the mother's health or the potential unborn life."5
The Court in Roe held that a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy in its early stages is constitutionally protected.'4 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority in Roe, articulated a three-part
holding based on a trimester approach to abortion regulation."
This holding purports to recognize a woman's fundamental right to
have an abortion when not in conflict with a compelling state interest
in protecting the fetus. First, before the fetus reaches viability, a
woman may have an abortion unfettered by "undue interference"
from the state.5" During the first trimester, or before viability, the
state's interests in protecting the mother's health and the potential
life of the child by prohibiting abortion are insufficient to overcome
the woman's fundamental right to an abortion. 7 Accordingly, the
pregnant woman is free from state regulation when seeking an
abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy.
The rest of Roe's trimester framework does not grant pregnant
women such liberties. In the second part of the holding, states are
free to restrict access to abortion after the fetus has reached viability,
as long as provisions allow an abortion when the woman's health is
endangered." In the third part, the Court recognizes the "impor-
tant and legitimate" state interest in protecting the health of the
woman and the potential life.59
51. 410 U.S. at 154 ("The right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but this
right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.").
52. Id. at 155 (agreeing with lower courts that the states' interests in protecting "health,
medical standards, and prenatal life" may become more compelling than a woman's right to an
abortion).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 160, 163 (asserting that viability of the fetus occurs at twenty-four to twenty-eight
weeks and holding that the "State's important and legitimate interest in potential life" becomes
compelling at viability). "[Pirior to this 'compelling' point, the attending physician, in
consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his
medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated." Id. at 163.
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973).
56. I. at 164.
57. Id. at 163-64 (holding that it is only after viability that the state's interest in the fetus
justifies prohibiting abortion).
58. Id. ("If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as
to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother.").
59. Id. at 162 ("[T]he State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving
and protecting the health of the pregnant woman ... [and] it has still another important and
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These restrictions, which depend on a fetus' viability, reflect the
trimester approach. During the first trimester of pregnancy, the
woman is free from state regulation when seeking an abortion.' In
the second trimester, the state's interest in providing for the health
of the mother allows some regulation of abortion. 1 In the third
trimester, the fetus is viable, and thus the state's interest in the
potential life of the fetus takes priority over the mother's privacy
interest. 2  "[T]he 'compelling' point is at viability."63 Prohibitions
on abortion during this final trimester are permissible in deference
to the potential life.' In essence, the trimester approach enabled
the Court to recognize a woman's right to abort without ignoring
competing interests of the state.
In some respects, Roe represents a departure from privacy jurispru-
dence. For example, Justice Blackmun spoke not only of "compel-
ling" government interests as necessary tojustify abortion restrictions,
but also of "important and legitimate" state interests.65 This lan-
guage suggests that although abortion is considered an important
component of a woman's fundamental right to privacy, courts are not
required to engage in strict scrutiny when reviewing a state law
restricting abortion after fetal viability, because state interests are
automatically compelling.66 This lesser scrutiny indicates a departure
from traditional fundamental rights jurisprudence, which typically
employs strict scrutiny.
67
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court decided another landmark
abortion case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey.' Casey substantially changed the limits placed upon states in
legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.").
60. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
61. Id.
62. I& (holding that the state may regulate abortion in promoting its interest in the
potentiality of human life in the third trimester, except where abortion is necessary for the
preservation of the mother's life or health).
63. Id. at 163.
64. See i. (holding that the state's important and legitimate interest in potential life
becomes compelling after viability because the fetus is then capable of life outside the mother's
womb).
65. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
66. Id. at 162-63.
67. See Zablocki v. Redhall, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny to the right to
marry); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny to the fundamental
right of interstate travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (employing strict scrutiny to
assess the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 535 (1965) (applying strict scrutiny to the fundamental right of married persons to
obtain contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (applying strict scrutiny to
compulsory sterilization of prisoners in light of its violation of the right to procreate).
68. 112S. Ct. 2791,2803,2812,2822,2830 (1992) (writing for the CourtJustice O'Connor,
joined byJustices Kennedy and Souter, reaffirmed Roes central holding and upheld the statute's
273
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regulating abortion.69 Officially, while the Court did not overrule
Roe v. Wade, its Casey decision greatly constricted Roe's previous
holding.7 In fact, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
appeared reluctant even to recognize the precedential effect of Roes
view on the state's interests in the potential life:
We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been Members
of the Court when the valuation of the State interest came before
it as an original matter, would have concluded, as the Roe Court
did, that its weight is insufficient tojustify a ban on abortions prior
to viability even when it is subject to certain exceptions. The
matter is not before us in the first instance, and coming as it does
after nearly 20 years of litigation in Roes wake we are satisfied that
the immediate question is not the soundness of Roe's resolution of
the issue, but the precedential force that must be accorded to its
holding."
As a result, commentators have since stated that access to abortion is
no longer a fundamental right, and that a woman who seeks an
abortion is unlikely to be guaranteed the same protections afforded
other fundamental rights. 2
In Casey, the Court reviewed five provisions of a 1989 Pennsylvania
abortion law. 3 These provisions were challenged by abortion clinics
and physicians in a lawsuit seeking an injunction against the stat-
ute.7' The provisions were as follows: (1) there existed only a
narrow definition of "medical emergency" in which an abortion could
be performed to preserve the health of the mother;75 (2) the woman
medical emergency definition and invalidated its spousal notification provision). The plurality
stood alone in its establishment of the "undue burden" test, its acceptance of viability as a
constitutional marker, and its dismissal of the Roe trimester framework. Id. at 2817-19.
69. Id. at 2818 (rejecting the Roe trimester framework as a means of ensuring that a
woman's right to choose is not subordinated by a potential life, and, instead, emphasizing the
state's interest in assuring that a woman's choice to abort is thoughtful and informed).
70. Id. at 2821, 2823 (using strict scrutiny to overrule in part two abortion cases that struck
down restrictive abortion laws). The two cases, Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) and City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), invalidated ordinances requiring awoman to be provided with
specific information before she could seek an abortion. The Court in Casey found that "[t]o the
extent Akron land Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when the government requires...
the giving of truthful, non-misleading information about the nature of the procedure, the
attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the 'probable gestational age' of the fetus,
those cases ... are overruled." Id. (citations omitted).
71. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2817 (1992).
72. SeeKolbert & Gans, supra note 14, at 1154 (discussing how the Court backed away from
affording women the highest level of constitutional protection by using the undue burden test
instead of strict scrutiny).
73. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (discussing the five provisions).
74. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2796.
75. See id at 2822 (affirming the definition of medical emergency as construed by the
appellate court).
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had to give her informed consent after a twenty-four hour waiting
period prior to an abortion;76 (3) married women were required to
notify spouses of their intention to abort;" (4) minors had to gain
parental consent prior to an abortion;78 and (5) abortion clinics
were held to stringent reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
79
Four of the limitations on abortion survived the Court's scrutiny.
First, the medical emergency provision, which narrowly defined
medical emergency, was not found to be an undue burden on the
woman's right to choose." Second, the Court supported the twenty-
four hour waiting period requiring a woman to wait and receive
information to ensure that her decision to abort be "informed."8'
Third, the Court upheld the parental consent requirement.8 2
Finally, the recordkeeping and recording requirements, all of which
make abortion more difficult, 3 survived intact. Only the spousal
notification provision was considered a significant obstacle to
obtaining an abortion. 4 The conclusion regarding this limitation
76. Id. (establishing that a doctor must inform the woman of her alternatives, as well as the
procedures involved and the potential harmful effects of abortion, before her consent is
considered "informed"); see also C. Elaine Howard, Note, The Roe'd To Confusion: Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1457, 1476 (1993) (recounting the judicial history of the
informed consent doctrine and its original purpose).
77. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2826-27.
78. Id. at 2832; see also Mary Edwards & Brian D. Lee, Note, ConstitutionalLaw--Abortion-A
Regulation Requiring a Woman To Notify Her Husband Before Receiving An Abortion is Impermissible
Because It Unduly Burdens the Woman's Abortion Right-Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 23 SETON
HALL L. REV. 255, 289 (1992) (reviewing the court of appeal's reasoning that ajudicial bypass
option to the parental consent provision would cure any undue burden parental consent would
put on a minor seeking an abortion; the Supreme Court validated this reasoning).
79. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2832 (reviewing the reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
which included filing the names and addresses of every facilitywhich performs abortions, as well
as identifying information for each party involved in an abortion).
80. See id. at 2822 (summarizing the court of appeal's interpretation of the Pennsylvania
statute defining medical emergency). Even though there was some possibility that the statutory
definition of medical emergency was too narrow, the appellate court interpreted the statute as
"not in any way pos[ing] a significant threat to the life or health of a woman." Id The
Supreme Court deferred to this construction of the statute. Id.
81. See id. at 2826 (stressing the importance of informed consent because it facilitates
making a wise decision).
82. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2832 (1992)
(noting that requiring informed parental consent before a minor may seek an abortion will
allow parents or guardians the opportunity to consult privately with their daughter to discuss the
consequences of her decision).
83. See id. at 2832-33 (listing the recordkeeping and recording requirements of the statute).
For example, the district court found that "many physicians, particularly those that previously
discontinued performing abortions because of harassment, will refuse to refer patients to
abortion clinics if their names will appear on these reports. This would result in the imposition
of an undue burden on the woman's ability to obtain an abortion." Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1392 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
84. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2826-33 (discussing the testimony heard by the district court
regarding the dangers of forcing a battered woman to notify her husband before obtaining an
abortion).
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was reached only after extensive consideration of the potential impact
of domestic violence on married women's choices.'
In the written analysis, Justice O'Connor meticulously analyzed the
problems of Roe and concluded that its holding had not proven
unworkable. 6 The majority did not disturb Rods categorization of
state interests using viability as a marker for the boundaries of state
interference, even though advanced medical technology in the 1990s
has moved this viability marker safely to either earlier or later in the
pregnancy.8 7 However, Casey rejected Roe's trimester approach as too
rigid.' Instead, a new holding employing an "undue burden" test
was adopted providing that "[a ] n undue burden exists, and therefore
a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
before the fetus attains viability." 9 In other words, state regulations
that discourage abortion, by making it inconvenient, expensive, or
complex, are permitted, as long as they are not "a substantial obstacle
to the woman's exercise of the right to choose."9 In addition, these
regulations are considered a reasonable burden on aborting a
nonviable fetus; abortion of a viable fetus is still within the province
of the states to prohibit entirely.9'
Casey's new undue burden test has the effect of affording more
deference toward the state's interest in protecting a potential life.
"Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism
by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express
profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted .... ,92
The leading indicator of this newfound deference is the level of
85. See id. at 2830 (finding that the mother's liberty interest weighs more heavily than the
father's because "the state has touched not only upon the private sphere of the family but upon
the very bodily integrity of the pregnant woman"); see also 77e Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading
Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 201, 206-07 (1992) (discussing the Court's recognition of domestic
violence as a reason for striking down the spousal notification requirement; also highlighting
the tragic failure of the Court to accord the same protection for pregnant adolescent victis of
family violence as it does to adult victims of domestic violence in its decision not to inalate
the parental notification requirement). For a further discussion of the Court's invalidation of
the spousal notification requirement, see Anderson, supra note 14, at 328.
86. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2809-12.
87. See id. at 2816-17 (commenting that although there may be medical developments that
affect the precise point of viability, "this is an imprecision within tolerable limits").
88. Id. at 2818; see also The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 85, at 203-04
(discussing the rejection of Roes trimester framework and the application of the undue burden
test, rather than strict scrutiny review).
89. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821.
90. Id. ("What is at stake is the woman's tight to make the ultimate decision, not a right to
be insulated from [the state] in doing so.").
91. See id. (reaffirming Roe's holding that the state may proscribe abortion after viability).
92. Id. (maintaining that state measures designed to persuade a woman to choose childbirth
over abortion will be upheld as long as no undue burden results).
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scrutiny applied by the Court in Casey.93  The state's interest in
potential life is deemed a "substantial" interest, and if abortion
restrictions are "reasonably related" to that legitimate end, they will
be upheld. 4 Gone is the application of strict scrutiny, an applica-
tion regularly reserved for those rights labelled "fundamental,"
including the right to privacy and matters of procreation.95
The Court in Casey attempted to lessen the importance of the rights
conferred by Roe by making it easier for the state to trump those
rights.9" The majority conceded that while Roe properly reveres the
woman's liberty interest in recognition of the Griswold string of
cases,97 the Court hinted that the state interest in fetal protection
actually may be a compelling one, enough to override the woman's
liberty interest when faced with tough state abortion laws.9"
[I] t is a constitutional liberty of the woman to have some freedom
to terminate her pregnancy. We conclude that the basic decision
in Roe was based on a constitutional analysis which we cannot now
repudiate. The woman's liberty is not so unlimited, however, that
from the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of the
unborn, and at a later point in fetal development the State's
interest in life has sufficient force so that the right of the woman
to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted.'
Casey breathes new life into Rods language of "important and
legitimate" state interests, as compared to compelling state interests
that would have been required under a strict scrutiny analysis. 100
Casey's holding clearly establishes the lesser scrutiny under which
states may place greater weight on the interests of a woman's health
93. See id. at 2820 (discussing the Court's use of the undue burden standard rather than
strict scrutiny).
94. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. CL 2791, 2821 (1992); see also
text accompanying note 72 (discussing the impact of the diminished constitutional protection
for women seeking abortions as evidenced by the partial overruling of recent decisions where
strict scrutiny had been used to bar state-mandated information and twenty-four hour mandatory
delays).
95. Casey, 112 S. CL at 2804-08; see also supra part I (discussing the Supreme Court's
historical treatment of these rights).
96. Casey, 112 S. CL at 2817; see also supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text
97. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810.
98. Id. at 2817. In Webster, a case that appeared after Roe but before Casey, the Supreme
Court suggested that a compelling interest in protecting potential life may exist even before
viability. SeeWebster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 519 (1989) (pointing out that
there does not have to be a rigid line only at the point of viability, and citing from the dissenters
in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 795 (1986),
that "the State's interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling before viability").
99. Casey, 112 S. CL at 2816.
100. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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and the potential life of the child, than that accorded to the woman's
right to privacy.101
The question arises: what is the difference between procreative
liberty and the right to an abortion? Is not a decision to abort the
ultimate decision regarding procreation? Why are the doctrinal
categories of Casey and Roejudged to be different? Justice O'Connor
sees Roe as the "intersection of two lines of decisions."" 2 One line
includes cases such as Griswold, which afford substantial freedoms to
individuals regarding decisions about intimate relationships.' The
other line is exemplified by cases such as Cruzan v. Director Missouri
Department of Health,104 which limit the state's power-out of respect
for bodily integrity-to either require or deny certain medical
treatment to individuals.' The Supreme Court has recognized
further that Roe and its progeny are in a class by themselves. While
the importance of the woman's liberty interest cannot be diminished
easily, error might be found in the alleged magnitude of the state's
interest in fetal protection. Becauge Roe is factually concerned with
post-conception decisions, it stands apart from other liberty cases that
do not involve the post-conception potential for life.'05 Some
scholars have suggested that "[a] t the core of this sphere is the right
of the individual to make for himself [or herself] ... fundamental
decisions that shape family life: whom to marry; whether and when
101. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818 (describing the important and legitimate right of the state
to enact rules and regulations designed to encourage women to continue their pregnancies).
102. Id. at 2810.
103. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text (outlining the judicial history of this line
of cases).
104. 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (requiring a showing by clear and convincing evidence that a
patient in a persistent vegetative state wishes life-sustaining treatment to be ceased); see also
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992) (holding that it is unconstitutional to administer anti-
psychotic drugs to a mentally ill prisoner against his will during the course of his trial, without
"findings that there were no less intrusive alternatives, that the medication was medically
appropriate, and that it was essential for the sake of defendant's safety or the safety of others");
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding that a mentally ill state prisoner could be
treated with anti-psychotic drugs against his will if the prisoner was found to be dangerous and
treatment was in the prisoner's medical interest); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)
(finding that forcing an emetic into a defendant's stomach against his will in order to get him
to vomit two capsules of morphine violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding that a Massachusetts'
regulation requiring all citizens to be vaccinated did not violate the Constitution when the
vaccinations were "deemed necessary for public health and safety").
105. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810 (discussing Roe "not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty
but as a rule ... of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases
recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its
rejection").
106. See id.
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to have children; and with what values to rear those children."0 7
Clearly, the right to an abortion-a fundamental decision affecting
family life-falls within this class of interests. "The question of
constitutionality [in Roe] is a more difficult one than that involved in
Griswold and Eisenstadt only because the asserted state interest is more
important, not because of any difference in the individual interests in-
volved. 10 8
The Supreme Court appears to have lost sight of the fact that the
rights to abortion and contraception stem from the same underlying
right to privacy, which is fundamental and sacred in U.S. jurispru-
dence. There is no real difference between the two types of cases
regarding the degree of privacy that must be afforded women.
III. THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT'S VIEWS
ON THE RIGHT TO REFRAIN FROM PROCREATION
A. The Frozen Preembryos
The facts of Davis are terribly cruel."°9 Thirty-year old Junior
Lewis Davis"' and his wife, twenty-eight-year old Mary Sue Davis, l"
repeatedly attempted to conceive a child, but were unsuccessful,"
During the first four years of their marriage, the Davises suffered the
pain and disappointment of five tubal pregnancies.' Finally, in
1985, the Davises attempted more drastic measures; they entered an
107. Philip B. Heymann & Douglas E. Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its
Critics, 53 B.U. L. Rav. 765, 772 (1973); see also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810 (stating that subsequent
constitutional developments after Roe have not disturbed "the scope of recognized protection
accorded to the liberty relating to intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about
whether or not to beget or bear a child").
108. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 107, at 772 (emphasis added).
109. See Ronald Smothers, Court Gives Ex-Husband Rights on Use of Embiyos, N.Y. TIMES, June
2, 1992, at Al (summarizing the ruling in Davis and quoting Arthur L. Caplan, Director of the
Center for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Minnesota, who indicated that the holding of
Davis is even more cruel to Mrs. Davis, in that it belittles her affirmative right to procreate). See
generally Kimberly H. Harris, Comment, Family Law-Davis v. Davis: A Step Back for the Right to
Procreate 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 399, 405 (1993) (analyzing the right to avoid procreation as
decided by the Tennessee Supreme Court).
This author is aware that Mrs. Davis Stowe (formerly Mary Sue Davis, see infra note 111) is
extremely distraught at the court's decision in Davis, and intends no disrespect by supporting
the case's outcome. The law too often overlooks the feelings of those whose lives it impacts, but
in a situation as heart-breaking as the instant case, Mrs. Davis Stowe's intense pain and hardship
should not be brushed aside. The author hopes that Mrs. Davis Stowe may someday realize her
significant contribution to women's rights.
110. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *55 (Blount County Cir. Ct.
Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989).
111. Id. at *72. Mary Sue Davis eventually remarried and took the last name of Stowe. This
article will refer to her as "Mrs. Davis" for the historical portion of the article, and "Mrs. Davis
Stowe" for the remainder.
112. See it. at *7374.
113. Id. at *73.
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"in vitro fertilization" [hereinafter "IVF"] program." 4  During the
program, Mrs. Davis was subjected to numerous drugs, injections, and
surgical procedures, often resulting in anxiety and disappoint-
ment.' 15  Initial attempts at IVF failed." 6  The Davises then at-
tempted adoption; however, the mother of the child the Davises
were to adopt decided, at the last minute, to keep her child."' The
Davises returned to the IVF program in the fall of 1988, eager to try
a new cryopreservation program." 9 In this procedure, nine ova
were removed from Mrs. Davis and then inseminated in the laboratory
by Mr. Davis' sperm. 2 ' Two fertilized ova were implanted (unsuc-
cessfally) in Mrs. Davis' womb, and the other seven were frozen in
order to be preserved for future use.'
B. The Divorce
Unfortunately, and undoubtedly due in part to their continued
inability to conceive, the Davis' relationship deteriorated. They
divorced after nine years of marriage. 22 The single issue litigated
in the separation pertained to the seven frozen preembryos 23 Ques-
tions arose as to who would have custody of the fertilized ova, and
what could be done with them. 24
Mrs. Davis' argument was that the seven preembryos were life, and
with implantation, she would be able to have children in the
114. IH
115. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *73-74 (Blount County
Cir. Ct. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989) (listing the procedures Mrs. Davis had to go through including
"six 1VF attempts, [where] no cryopreservation procedures were employed; each implantation
was the culmination of weeks of preparation-drugs to stimulate her reproductive system...
insemination in vitro, anxious hours of waiting to confirm fertilization, implantation-then
additional weeks of waiting to determine if an in uero pregnancy had occurred").
116. See id. (describing the self-injections Mrs. Davis had to administer as well as various other
preparation procedures she had to go through before surgery and insemination).
117. See id. at *56 (recounting how the Davises paid the medical expenses of a Kentucky girl
who offered her child for adoption, but subsequently decided to keep it).
118. Id.
119. See iL at *6 n.3, *56 (defining "cryopreservation" as a procedure by which cells are
frozen in a laboratory using liquid nitrogen, then later thawed for use).
120. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *6 nn.1, 4 & 6, *57 (Blount
County Cir. Ct. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989) (defining "ova" as unfertilized human eggs and
"insemination" as the placing together of the sperm and the ovum).
121. See id. at *6-15 nn.3, 4, 6, 10 & 20 (defining terms used in IVF).
122. Id. at *4.
123. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992); see also Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496,
1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *8 n.10, *18 (Blount County Cir. Ct. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989)
(defining "embryo" as "a beginning or undeveloped stage of anything" and "preembryo" as a
product of gametic union that lasts from fertilization for up to fourteen days).
124. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589 (describing how the Davises were able to agree on all aspects
of their separation, except for who was to have custody of the seven frozen preembryos).
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future.121 She testified about a motherly attachment to the embryos,
and about her desire to give birth to them-even as a single par-
ent.126  However, when the case ultimately reached the Tennessee
Supreme Court, Mrs. Davis had remarried and wished at that point to
donate the embryos to another couple, instead of implanting them in
herself.1 27 In spite of her change of heart about what to do with the
preembryos, Mrs. Davis continued throughout the entire litigation to
consider the embryos "potential life."128
Mr. Davis initially preferred to keep the preembryos frozen until he
could make a final, thoughtful decision about them.1 2 He wanted
either joint custody of the preembryos, or, as a last resort, to have
them available for implantation exclusively by Mrs. Davis; he emphati-
cally did not want them donated to another infertile couple. 3 ' His
testimony at trial was summed up in the appendix of the trial court's
opinion:
Mr. Davis opposes Mrs. Davis' use of the embryos because he does
not want to be ' ... raped of [his] reproductive rights .. .'; he
maintains her use without his consent forces unwanted parenthood on
him, a situation which disturbs him greatly. He doesn't want a
child produced to live in a single-parent situation."'
While Mr. Davis maintained during the trial that he preferred not to
have the embryos destroyed," 2 he ultimately conceded he would
rather see them destroyed than donated to another couple. 3 3 By
the time the case reached the Tennessee Supreme Court, Mr. Davis
was "adamantly opposed" to a donation and freely admitted that he
would have the preembryos destroyed if given that option.3
125. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *74 (Blount County Cir. Ct.
Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989).
126. Id.
127. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590, 604 (discussing Mrs. Davis' desire to donate the
preembryos to another couple and her concern that the procedures she underwent would have
been useless if the preembryos were destroyed).
128. See id. at 594 (explaining the trial judge's agreement with Mrs. Davis' belief and his
reasoning that, because it was "in the best interest of the children" to be born, rather than
destroyed, Mrs. Davis should be awarded custody of the "children in vitro" because she was ready
to provide them with this opportunity).
129. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *58 (Blount County Cir. Ct.
Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989).
130. Id.
131. Id. at *59 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at *58 (requesting the court to award joint custody of the embryos, prohibit their
use until he could decide an appropriate course of action, or consider only Mrs. Davis for
implantation).
133. Id
134. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992).
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Four experts on embryonic development and the law testified at the
Davis trial."3 5 These experts testified as to their understandings of
a human preembryo, the development of a human child, the history
of in vitro fertilization, and the process of cryopreservation of human
cells.'36 Description of such scientific detail is beyond the scope of
this article; therefore, suffice it to state that out of all the experts, only
one, Dr. Lejeune, believed that life begins at conception and that the
seven fertilized ova were "tiny persons."3 7
C. The Tennessee Lower Courts" Decisions
The presiding judge in the case, W. Dale Young of the Blount
County Circuit Court in Tennessee, apparently followed the analysis
of Dr. Lejeune. He not only granted custody of the embryos to Mrs.
Davis for implantation,"3 ' but also held that life begins at concep-
tion."3 9 The judge did not simply make findings on custody, but,
without precedent, found that embryos are human beings with legal
rights, even before they are attached to the uterine wall. 4 ' On
appeal, Mr. Davis argued that the trial court denied him his "right to
control reproduction," as Mrs. Davis would have full control over the
embryos for implantation.' Thus, Mr. Davis could be forced to
"become a parent against his will." 4 The Tennessee Court of
Appeals, applying strict scrutiny, found no compelling state interest
and reversed the trial court." The appeals court decreed that the
135. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *61-71, *76-84 (Blount
County Cir. Ct. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989) (providing a detailed account of the scientific testimony
presented at trial by the four experts: John Robertson, a legal scholar;, Dr. King, the Davis'
gynecologist who performed the IVF procedures; Dr. Charles Shivers, a scientist devoted to the
study of embryological development; and Dr. Jerome Lejeune, a French geneticist).
136. Id.
137. Davis, 842 SW.2dat593. For a scathing review of Dr. Lejeune's testimony, see generally
GeorgeJ. Annas, A French Homunculus in a Tennessee Cour4 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 20 (1989)
(outlining the highlights of Dr. Lejeune's testimony, including his statement that a chicken egg,
which Mr. Davis' lawyer held up for him to identify, was an egg, and the lawyer's response: "I
thought you would have told me that it was an early chicken.").
138. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *37 (Blount County Cir. Ct.
Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989).
139. Id. at *30-31 (holding that the case's record supported the conclusion that life begins
at conception, and that the preembryos were human beings).
140. Id. at *30-35 (determining that no Tennessee public policy existed which prevents
development of the common law regarding embryos, and concluding they should be considered
human beings with legal rights). The court cited, as its authority, the common law doctrine of
parens pafriae--"the power of the sovereign to watch over the interests of those who are
incapable of protecting themselves." Id. at *34-35 (citing In re: Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (NJ.
1988)).
141. Davis v.,Davis, C/A No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.
13, 1990).
142. Id.
143. Id. at *11.
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parties would have joint custody of the embryos, because: "[i] t would
be repugnant and offensive to constitutional principles to order Mary
Sue to implant these fertilized ova against her will. It would be
equally repugnant to orderJunior to bear the psychological, if not the
legal, consequences of paternity against his will.""4
D. The Tennessee Supreme Court's Holding
The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review in the case even
though it agreed with the appellate court's constitutional analysis. 45
The court wished to clarify the law in an area that had yet to be
charted, and to review the case in light of the changed legal positions
of Junior Davis and Mary Sue Davis, both of whom had remarried.' 46
In order to make its ruling, the court in Davis relied on the right
to privacy, especially the right to procreational autonomy established
by the Griswold line of cases.147 The court's interpretation indicates
that whether someone will become a parent rests on his or her
constitutional right to privacy.148  In the IVF process, even though
the woman is affected more severely than the man, the court held
that each potential parent "must be seen as entirely equivalent
gamete-providers." 49 Preembryos were not found to be persons or
property, but a special category deserving of respect for their
"potential for human life." 5 ' Because both Mr. Davis and Mrs.
Davis Stowe had rights of equal status, the court balanced those rights
and determined that Mr. Davis' right to refrain from procreation
outweighed Mrs. Davis Stowe's right to procreate.'
Unlike the abortion cases, the state's interest in protecting potential
life in Davis did not rise to a level of importance necessary to
144. Id. at *8-9.
145. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992).
146. See id at 590 (stating that review was granted "because of the obvious importance of the
case in terms of the development of law regarding the new reproductive technologies, and
because the Court of Appeals d[id] not give adequate guidance to the trial court in the event
the parties cannot agree").
147. See id. at 598-601; see also supra part I.
148. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600 (holding that "in terms of the Tennessee state constitution,
the right of procreation is a vital part of an individual's right to privacy"). Moreover, the court
stated that, "whatever its ultimate constitutional boundaries, the right ofprocreational autonomy
is composed of two tights of equal significance-the right to procreate and the right to avoid
procreation." Id. at 601.
149. See id. (explaining that a "gamete" is a mature sex cell that can unite with another sex
cell to form a new animal).
150. Id. at 597.
151. Id. at 603 (observing how a decision "which results in the gestation of the preembryos
would impose unwanted parenthood on him, with all of its possible financial and psychological
consequences"); see also infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
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withstand the court's scrutiny.15 2  Four reasons were indicated for
this occurrence. First, the court cited Roe and Webster to claim that
because the state interest of protecting potential life does not become
compelling until after viability, certainly it would not be compelling
at a developmental stage far in advance of viability.' Second,
Tennessee public policy states that "persons born alive" enjoy a higher
status than do the unborn.M Third, no such state interest is
articulated in Tennessee's abortion statute. 55 Fourth, no interest
is sufficient to outweigh the gamete-providers' procreational choices
because, even if another person were to gestate these preembryos,
Junior and Mary Sue Davis would still be parents, at least in the
genetic sense.156 After balancing the interests of both parties, the
court held that the party wishing to avoid procreation, Mr. Davis,
prevailed, and that the preembryos could be destroyed.'57 The
court noted that, although Mrs. Davis would suffer an emotional
burden in knowing that the IVF procedures she underwent would
never result in the creation of children, Mr. Davis had a more
significant interest in avoiding parenthood.1SB The court reasoned
that donation of the preembryos would rob him of his "procreational
152. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992) (noting that the state's interest in the
potential life of the preembryos was not sufficient to limit the freedom of the parties to decide
whether or not they wished to become parents).
153. See id. at 595.
154. See id. at 601 (explaining that Tennessee's abortion statutes reflect "a policy decision
to recognize that persons born alive or capable of sustaining life ex utero have a higher status
than do fetuses in utero").
155. See i& at 602 n.26 (noting the absence of an express state interest at this developmental
stage indicated that, at least in some instances, "the interest of living individuals in avoiding
procreation is sufficient to justify taking steps to terminate the procreational process, despite the
state's interest in potential life").
156. Id. at 602.
157. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604-05 (Tenn. 1992). Had the facts been slightly
different, the Davis decision may have yielded different results. First, the Davises made no
agreement or contract as to the disposition of unused embryos when they entered the IVF
program. I& at 592. If a written agreement had existed, the court merely would have upheld
the agreement, barring any unconscionability, and the case would never have reached the
Tennessee Supreme Court. Id at 597-98. Second, no Tennessee statute governed the
disposition of unused products of IVF. Id at 596. Third, no case law existed to guide the court,
except for. York v.Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (assuming, but not deciding, frozen
preembryos are "property," and that the IVF institute must return the plaintiffs' frozen embryo
as part of a bailment relationship); Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hosp., No. 74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 13, 1978) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (awarding damages to a woman whose VF
embryos preserved in a petri dish were destroyed deliberately by a doctor); and an Australian
IVF case involving a California couple who died intestate in a plane crash and whose frozen
embryos were left out of the distribution of the estate. See George P. Smith, Australia's Frozen
"Orphan" Embyos, 24 J. FAM. L 27 (1985-86) (describing this case and noting the need for
legislative regulation of IVF procedures in both Australia and the United States).
158. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
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autonomy," and of an opportunity to have a relationship with his
offspring, if a child were born. 59
Ultimately, in February, 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari to review the Davis case at the request of Mrs. Davis
Stowe." ° Without commenting on their reasons for declining to
hear the case, the Justices let stand the holding of an individual's
right to prevent procreation."' In June, 1993, five years after the
beginning of the painful struggle, Mr. Davis ordered the frozen
embryos destroyed.162
IV. WHY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE
THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT NOT TO PROCREATE FOR WOMEN
AS WELL AS MEN, IN THE TRADITION OF DAVIS V. DAVIS
There is something just a touch spooky here. As women's reproductive rights
are contracting men's rights seem to be expandin:
63
The U.S. Supreme Court should adopt the reasoning involved in
Davis when deciding the abortion issue, and stop judicially regulating
women's bodies. Pro-choice advocates welcomed the Davis decision
because of its recognition of the right to refrain from procrea-
tion.164  "Had the Justices accepted the arguments [of] Mrs. Davis
Stowe's lawyers-that human life begins at conception-the right to
reproductive privacy for all women [w]ould have been a dead
letter."165
If a pregnant woman can be guaranteed the freedom to choose
whether to have a child without the interference of courts or
legislatures at the beginning of the child-bearing process, then the
159. Id.
160. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993). See
generally Supreme Court: Justices Refuse to Hear Frozen Embryo Case, ABORTION REP., Feb. 23, 1993,
at 52 (noting that Davis had drawn interest from pro-choice activists and their opponents
because of the trial court's ruling that preembryos were constitutionally protected human
beings); Joan Biskupic, High Court Won't Hear Embyo Case, Woman Had Sought Control After Divorce,
WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1993, at A5 (chronicling the Supreme Court's refusal to challenge the
Tennessee Supreme Court's decision that Mr. Davis' right not to procreate was the overriding
privacy interest in the case).
161. Biskupic, supra note 160, at A5.
162. See generally Seven Embryos in Custody Case are Destroyed, N.Y. TIM s,June 16, 1993, at A18.
163. SeeEllen Goodman, Between Two ProcreationalRights, BOSTON GLOBE,June 4, 1992, at Op-
Ed 19 (commenting on the constriction of women's rights regarding procreation after Casey).
164. See Helene Cooper, Court Denies Mother's Bid for 7 Embyos, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1992, at
B9 (reporting that "[albortion rights activists called the decision a needed boost at a time when
abortion rights have come increasingly under fire from the U.S. Supreme Court"). But see
Smothers, supra note 109, at A16 (quoting the Executive Director of the National Right to Life
Committee in Washington, D.C., as saying- "[the most frightening aspect of this is the court
has decided that whatever party is seeking to destroy the unborn child prevails.").
165. Biskupic, supra note 160, at A5.
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opposition to the freedom of choice movement will be largely pre-
empted. In Casey, Justice O'Connor called abortion a "unique act,"
due to its implications not only for the mother, but also for her
family, spouse, doctors, and the allegedly potential life that is
destroyed.16  This poignant observation did not stop the Tennessee
Supreme Court from allowing Mr. Davis to dispose of seven pre-
embryos, each of which had been held to represent a potential
human life. 67 Mr. Davis' personal decision to destroy the preembry-
os had no less an effect on his family, his ex-wife, and society than
would a decision by Mrs. Davis Stowe to have an abortion.
A. Legal Status of the Unborn
A key question arises: can the decision in Davis apply to all
abortion decisions during all stages of fetal development, or is the
difference between status as a preembryo, as compared to that of a
fetus, too great in the eyes of the law?"6 The answer to this ques-
tion is overwhelmingly burdensome. It is the fundamental question
of "when does life begin?" What is important for the courts to
recognize is that this question provokes different answers in different
spheres: legal, medical, economic, religious, social, and moral. The
law must address only the legal answer to this question, and allow the
individual to arrive at his or her own moral solutions. 69 Justice
O'Connor addressed this reality in her plurality opinion in Casey:
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose
some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual
implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage.
Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code. 7°
166. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992).
167. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594-97 (Tenn. 1992) (observing that the critical point
of viability is a stage in fetal development far removed from that of the four- to eight-cell
preembryos in the case).
168. Statutory fetal rights continually spring up all over the country. Johnsen, supra note 27,
at 604-05. States burden pregnant women with a slew of regulations: from deciding to take the
fetus away from the mother before it is born if she endangers its health, to seizing custody of
fetuses in order to compel women against their wishes to undergo caesarean section deliveries.
I&
169. Bluntly criticizing the Davis trialjudge for both overstepping his bounds as ajudge and
forcing his own moral values on the parties, commentator George J. Annas stated that Davis
"provides a powerful example of what can go wrong when a trial court judge takes it upon
himself to 'solve' major bioethical issues." Annas, supra note 137, at 20.
170. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806.
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Declaring that life begins at conception is not only a scientifically
"egregious oversimplification," 7' but is also a conclusion not shared
by the Supreme Court in its abortion cases' analysis, or by the court
in Davis.'72 Scientifically and socially, birth is the landmark event
that gives a human its status: birth is the important event for parents;
it exposes the baby to a radically different environment than that
experienced in the uterus; and it is at this point that the baby begins
direct interaction with others in a social setting.'73 Further, the law
recognizes human life as beginning at birth, the point at which a
person earns legal status, and neither embryos nor fetuses are
considered legal persons with rights. 74 A person is not protected
by the U.S. or any state constitution until birth, and no Supreme
Court Justice has suggested a holding to the contrary.75 Under the
171. See CIFFoRD GROBSTEIN, SCIENCE AND THE UNBORN 23-24 (1988) (indicating that "one
must look more deeply into what fertilization or conception actually signifies with respect to
individuality").
172. The Tennessee Court of Appeals overruled the trial judge's finding that "life begins at
conception" and the Tennessee Supreme Court likewise held that preembryos represent only
the "potential for human life." Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594-97 (Tenn. 1992).
173. GROBsTEIN, supra note 171, at 121-22 (noting that birth is a landmark event in human
life history as it "thrusts the infant into a fundamentally new physiological and social existence
that influences all that follows").
174. See Bill E. Davidoff, Frozen Embryos: A Need for Thawing in the Legislative Process, 47 SMU
L REv. 131 (1993) (discussing the lack of positive law concerning the legal status of the
embryo); Tanya Feliciano, Davis v. Davis: What About Future Disputes?, 26 CoNN. L. REV. 305
(1993) (maintaining that only the state of Louisiana recognizes embryos to have legal rights)
(citing .A. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-33 (West 1991)); Susan Goldberg, Gametes and Guardians:
The Impropriety of Appointing Guardians Ad Litem for Fetuses and Embryos, 66 WASH. L. REV. 503
(1991) (arguing that courts should not give fetuses the legal status of persons); Barbara
Gregoratos, Tempest in the Laboratory: Medical Research on Spare Embryos from In Vitro Fertilization,
37 HASTINGS LJ. 977 (1986) (asserting the legal status of the embryo is undefined and legal
protections of the fetus are contingent upon live birth or viability); Clifton Perry & L. Kristen
Schneider, Cryopreserved Embryos: Who Shall Decide Their Fate?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 463 (1992)
(arguing that there are compelling reasons accepted worldwide for not viewing an embryo as
a person);John A. Robertson, Resolving Disputes Over Frozen Embryos, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
7 (1989) (contending that preembryos and fetuses should not be treated as persons because
they are not developmentally complete entities and may never realize their potential for
personhood); Michelle F. Sublett, Frozen Embryos: What Are They and How Should the Law Treat
Them?, 38 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 585 (1990) (claiming that the Supreme Court has refused to
interpret "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment as encompassing the unborn); Marcia Joy
Wurmbrand, Frozen Embryos: Moral; Socia, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079 (1986)
(discussing how the prevailing legal view is that neither fetuses nor embryos are persons within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Patricia A. King, TheJudicial Status of the
Fetus: A Proposalfor Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1647, 1687 (1976) (criticizing
the Supreme Court for its opinion in Roe which held that a fetus is not a constitutionally-
protected "person"). King argues that viability, not personhood, determines one's status for
legal protection, and that unborn viable fetuses merit all legal protections afforded to human
beings. Id. at 1648, 1672, 1687. She asserts that this change would present "no serious legal
problems," and that human status should be determined not by birth, but rather by the capacity
for independent existence. Id. at 1687.
175. "No member of this Court has ever suggested that a fetus is a 'person' within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 779 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Fourteenth Amendment, equal protection and due process are
afforded only to "persons born or naturalized in the United
States." 76 The common law definition of homicide historically has
not included the unlawful killing of a fetus. 7 7  Inheritance laws
generally recognize only those people who are born. I  Finally, the
Tennessee Wrongful Death Statute179 requires the live birth of a
fetus to sustain a wrongful death action; otherwise, a viable fetus is
not a "person" protected by the statute. 8 Both Justice Blackmun
in Roe and Justice O'Connor in Casey concluded that the state's
interest in protecting potential life begins at fetal viability-the time
at which a fetus technically could survive independent of the mother's
womb.'' Yet, an increasing state interest in the potential life of the
fetus does not automatically make the fetus a person. The Tennessee
Criminal Abortion Statute utilizes the trimester approach introduced
by Roe,"2 "[b]ut, even after viability, [fetuses] are not given legal
status equivalent to that of a person already born."'
Roe and Casey undoubtedly fuel an ever-strengthening debate over
the extent of fetal rights. The law once considered the fetus "an
entity independent from the pregnant woman with interests that are
potentially hostile to hers."84 Today, abortion cases and other
statutes come dangerously close to affording the fetus the same legal
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
177. Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (Mass. 1984) (noting that "[s]ince at
least the fourteenth century, the common law has been that the destruction of a fetus in utero
is not a homicide."). The Massachusetts court was the first, and thus far only, court to break
the common law tradition when it held that viable fetuses were included within the term
"person" for purposes of the state's vehicular homicide statute. Id. at 1330. In contrast, the
California murder statute is one example of many statutes that distinguishes murder of a human
being from murder of a fetus. CAL PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1986) ("Murder is the unlawful
killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.").
178. GROBSrEIN, supra note 171, at 121. For a description of exceptions to this general rule,
see generallyJohnsen, supra note 27, at 601 (citing decisions of 19th century cases which had
granted the fetus personhood for purposes of inheritance, provided itwas ultimately born alive).
179. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (1991).
180. See Davis v. Davis, C/A No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Sept. 13, 1990) (holding a viable fetus is not invested with legal rights until it is born).
181. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (establishing that the "compelling" point
for a state's "important and legitimate interest in potential life" is at viability, at which point the
fetus "presumably has the capacity of meaningful life outside the mother's womb"); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992) (stating that before
viability, a state's interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion, or the
imposition of significant obstacles to a woman's right to choose the procedure).
182. SeeTENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201 (1991) (fixing the first three months of pregnancy as
the time period prior to fetal viability).
183. Davis v. Davis, C/A No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.
13, 1990).
184. Johnsen, supra note 27, at 599 (discussing the historical treatment of fetal rights).
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status as a born person."t As a result, the expansion of fetal rights
ignores "far-reaching implications for women as the bearers of
fetuses.""'6 The assignment of legal status to an embryo or fetus is
further complicated by the interactive relationship between the
mother and the embryo or fetus. Dr. Clifford Grobstein calls it "a
relationship that is so close, intimate, and mutually dependent that it
can be called symbiotic[,] and has often been compared with
parasitism.""8 7
Fetal rights further ignore a woman's bodily integrity,'t u enlarge
the conflict between mother and fetus, 89 and provide courts with
a rationalization for restricting women's rights more severely 90 Yet,
the Fourteenth Amendment encourages equal protection of per-
sons.'91 How can laws be equitable that favor a fetus, which is not
a person, over a woman, who is a person, to the woman's detriment?
"[T]he embryo and mother are so intimately interrelated that the
status of one necessarily impinges on that of the other. The
relationship, however, does not involve equal status. The mother is
a fully established person with strongly defined rights, while the
embryo is rudimentary, both in function and status."'92
B. Viability as a Status Marker
One may argue that Davis does not apply to abortion cases, because
the state's interest in protecting potential life does not become
185. See generally Dawn E. Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant
Women's Lives AflerWebster, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 179 (1989) (considering the attendant problems
potentially experienced by women if fetuses are afforded the legal status and rights of
personhood). The far-reaching notion that fetuses are persons under the law may result in
criminal prosecution of a woman for harming a fetus while she is pregnant because, for
example, she did not follow doctor's orders, had a car accident while driving under the
influence of alcohol, or committed prenatal child abuse through drug use. Id. at 180. Tort
actions for prenatal injuries may also be charged against pregnant women as a "social penalty"
for undermining the interests of the fetus. Id These legal remedies allow the government to
dictate how pregnant women should conduct themselves if their behavior is deemed antithetic
to fetal rights. Id.
186. Johnsen, supra note 27, at 600.
187. GROBSTEIN, supra note 171, at 86 (noting that the mother becomes a temporary
biological host to her developing offspring).
188. SeeJohnsen, supra note 27, at 614 (discussing the infringement on women's liberty and
privacy interests that results from vesting fetuses with expanded constitutional protection). The
woman's right to privacy "is particularly importantwhen the state intervention involves a physical
intrusion on an individual's body." Itt
189. SeeJohnsen, supra note 27, at 605 (commenting on how fetal rights have been used to
the detriment of pregnant women's autonomy).
190. SeeJohnsen, supra note 27, at 600.
191. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
192. GROBSTEIN, supra note 171, at 139.
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compelling until the fetus reaches viability,193 and thus a woman is
free to seek an abortion before fetal viability. Because viability is the
critical point in deciding abortion cases according to both Roe and
Casey,194 any case dealing with preembryos would fall short of this
distinction because viability supposedly has not been reached. In
addition, the Tennessee Supreme Court was not ruling on abortion
in Davis.95 The court felt comfortable ruling on this matter be-
cause the preembryonic stage of development is far removed from
fetal development.19
The purpose of this article, however, is not to prove that the Davis
holding must apply to abortion cases, only that it should. The court's
overwhelming respect for a person's right to choose whether or not
to procreate in Davis is refreshing. The decision captures the essence
of the abortion debate and overshadows confusing, constantly shifting
scientific distinctions between stages of development. Both viable
fetuses and preembryos have the potential to become children, so
how can the state's interest in protecting potential life be defined
differently for abortion cases than for artificial insemination cases?
Furthermore, the issue of "whether the parties will become par-
ents,"197 the essential dispute in Davis,198 is a question that a wom-
an seeking an abortion in a state with restrictive abortion laws often
faces.
The viability framework does not account for the fact that advanc-
ing medical technology is moving the line of viability closer to
conception with each new discovery.199 One commentator argues
that because the frozen fertilized embryo can be sustained while
outside the mother's body, it is viable."0 This same commentator
193. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992)
(recognizing viability as the point at which state regulation of abortion becomes constitutional
given important and legitimate state objectives); Websterv. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490, 529 (1989) (O'ConnorJ., concurring); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
194. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
195. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (stating thatan inquiry into the legal status of preembryos
is outside the context of the abortion debate).
196. See id, at 596 (maintaining that a preembryo "should not be treated as a person, because
it has not yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet established as developmentally
individual, and may never realize its biologic potential").
197. Id. at 598.
198. Id.
199. See generaUy HenryJ. Hyde, The Human Life Bilk Some Issues and Answers, 27 N.Y.L SCH.
L REV. 1077 (1982) (commenting on controversial proposed legislation which attempts to grant
Congress the power to determine when a human being's life begins); David Westfall, Beyond
Abortion: ThePotentialReach ofa Human LifeAmendmen4 8 AM.J.L. & MED. 97 (1982) (discussing
proposed legislation which would grant fetuses civil rights and create "fetal personhood" for the
unborn at every stage of their biological development).
200. SeeTamara L. Davis, Comment, Protecting the CryopreservedEmbryo, 57 TENN. L. REV. 507,
514 (1990) (citing Roe v. Wade's definition of viability as the time when a fetus is "potentially
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further suggests that medical technology is advancing so quickly that,
in the future, fertilized ova may be sustained outside the mother's
body at all stages of development2 °
Therefore, viability, the cornerstone of both Roe and Casey, may
prove disastrous to women's privacy rights in the future. In light of
the aforementioned scientific advances, if the state's interest in
protecting potential life suddenly becomes compelling and legitimate
at viability, there potentially may be no point during pregnancy at
which states' interests will be deemed less important than a woman's
reproductive freedom.
Viability is an uncertain line; it is different for each fetus.0 2 How
can a court determine this line? When does abortion stop being a
woman's decision about what to do with her own body, and start to
become a barrier to the state's interest in protecting the potential
future life inside the mother? The "potential for life" for an unborn
human does not come magically into being at viability.20 3  The
state's concerns over the health of the fetus do not explode into
existence at the point of viability.2 4 For this reason, at least one
scholar argues that in the fetal rights context, "viability is a meaning-
less distinction" and the state's interest in protecting the health of the
fetus is "illegitimate."21 In the abortion context, viability is an
arbitrary marker-a convenient legal compromise balancing the
Court's slavish adherence to the Roe precedent with the anti-abortion
fervor purportedly sweeping the nation.
Application of Davis would make the distinction between preembry-
os and fetuses irrelevant in the abortion debate, because abortion
would be perceived as a personal choice, rather than as an act aimed
at frustrating state interests. Mr. Davis wanted the embryos destroyed
because, otherwise, his "reproductive rights" would be violated and
able to live outside the mother's womb albeit with artificial aide").
201. Id. at 514-15 & n.55 (discussing how advancement of the cryopreservation procedure
will create legal ramifications and alterations of the 1973 Roe trimester framework).
202. Id at 527 (reviewing the contradictory testimony of five expert witnesses on the
meaning and nature of viability).
203. See Arthur Allen Leff, The LeffDiaionay of Law: A Fragment, 94 YA. L.J. 1855, 1997
(1985) (defining viability as the theoretical ability to live independent from the mother and
noting that this definition is deceptive because it relies on social and legal bases, as opposed to
a purely biological classification).
204. SeeJohnsen, supra note 27, at 618-20;J6hnsen, supra note 185, at 190-92 (reviewing the
ways in which states' restrictions infringe on the rights of pregnant women throughout the
course of their entire pregnancies, not just once viability occurs).
205. Johnsen, supra note 27, at 619-20 & n.82 (arguing that the viability distinction is a way
to control women's choices by creating an arbitrary point at which state restrictions apply).
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"unwanted parenthood" would be forced upon him.20 6  Is it likely
that Mr. Davis would have changed his mind after the divorce, when
the embryo became a "viable" fetus in either Mrs. Davis' womb or in
a donee's womb? His predicament would remain the same, and his
decision would also remain private and personal. Women's choices
about abortion are no different. The law must give women equal
treatment in this matter.
C. The Beginning of Parenthood
If the distinction between preembryos and embryos was not
important in deciding Davis,2 7 then courts should not hesitate to
consider Davis when deciding abortion cases. In spite of the fact that
the embryos remain in a petri dish, they are fertilized with male
sperm and merely await implantation in the female uterus. 208 They
thus arguably resemble the fertilized egg already implanted. Genetic
consequences are dictated at fertilization whether or not the egg has
been implanted and the woman is pregnant.20 9 Thus, each of these
situations triggers identical parental decisions regarding procreation.
One commentator argues that frozen embryos have nothing to do
with abortion, because with frozen embryos, no one is "pregnant."M
In fact, the Tennessee Court of Appeals justified its reversal of the
trial court's decision in Davis based in part on the fact that no one
was pregnant.211 The appellate judges reasoned that there was no
justification to order implantation against the will of both parties." 2
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision was based firmly
on the right to avoid procreation. 213  Most procreational decisions
usually "are made prior to pregnancy, and thus have little relevance
206. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *59 (Blount County Cir.
Ct. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1989).
207. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tenn. 1992) (commenting that this distinction
is not dispositive but must be understood in relation to the trial court's analysis and its
misguided conclusions on the issue of when life begins).
208. See Davis, supra note 200, at 508-09.
209. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 59&-94 (referring to a doctor's testimony which concluded that
fourteen days after the merger of sperm and egg, an embryo's cellular development and genetic
composition are determined fully).
210. See Davis, supra note 200, at 514 (differentiating the Roe and Webster decisions from the
Davis facts because frozen embryos are outside a woman's body, thus negating the privacy
interest asserted in the current abortion case law).
211. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589 (concluding that without an actual pregnancy, the parties
share an equal interest in the ova).
212. See Davis v. Davis, C/A No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App,
Sept. 13, 1990) (discussing how implantation against Mr. Davis' will constituted violative state
action). Mrs. Davis, who had since remarried, wanted to donate the embryos to a childless
couple rather than implant them in her own uterus. Id.
213. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601 (reviewing the case law which established procreational
autonomy and parental rights as fundamental guarantees of ordered liberty).
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within the abortion context."4 Such decisions are made each time
a couple chooses to abstain from sexual intercourse or to use
contraceptives; each time a couple tries to conceive; and each time a
woman chooses abortion in the event of an unwanted pregnancy.
Some may argue that Davis should not be applied to abortion cases,
because the court specifically narrowed the potential parenthood issue
to that of "genetic parenthood.""' One commentator points out a
flaw in this aspect of the court's reasoning: if the issue is solely one
of genetics, how can the courtjustify its reliance on "all other aspects
of parenthood?"" 6 Mr. Davis did not want to become a parent
against his will simply because he was tied genetically to the frozen
embryos-he did not want to be forced into parenthood because he
would be tied to them as any potential father would be to an unborn
child." In contrast, women's choices about abortion affect all stages
of potential parenthood-genetic, gestation, child-bearing, and child-
rearing-much more than in Mr. Davis' case.'
Adopting the reasoning employed in Davis achieves a succinct
separation between law and morality: drawing a clear line between,
on the one hand, the fundamental privacy right of a woman making
one of the most important, painful decisions of her life and, on the
other, legitimate government intrusion upon her personal life and
214. Id. at 602.
215. Id at 603 (upholding the uniqueness of the interest identified in the case, and its
limited applicability to other cases).
216. SeeHarris, supra note 109, at 404 (finding an inconsistency in limiting the Davis decision
to only IVF cases, when the court included in its analysis other aspects of parenthood which fit
into the context of the abortion debate). But see Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603 (describing the four
aspects of parenthood, but limiting the issue solely to genetics for purposes of the court's legal
analysis).
217. The decision in Davis did not even consider the possibility that Mr. Davis, by virtue of
being male, might have been subjected to laws that deny paternal rights to sperm donors if the
embryos had been donated. See Note, supra note 2, at 1535-37 (rejecting genetic ties as a basis
for parental rights, and emphasizing the existence of a parent-child emotional relationship as
a basis for determining public policy).
218. SeeDavis, 842 S.W.2d at 603 (describing the stages of parenthood in detail). The court
stated:
[t]he unique nature of this case requires us to note that the interests of these parties
in parenthood are different in scope than the parental interest considered in other
cases. Previously, courts have dealt with the childbearing and child-rearing aspects
of parenthood. Abortion cases have dealt with gestational parenthood. In this case,
the Court must deal with the question of genetic parenthood. We conclude,
moreover, that an interest in avoiding genetic parenthood can be significant enough
to trigger the protections afforded to all other aspects of parenthood. The
technological fact that someone unknown to these parties could gestate these
preembryos does not alter the fact that these parties, the gamete-providers, would
become parents in that event, at least in the genetic sense. The profound impact
this would have on them supports their right to sole decisional authority as to
whether the process of attempting to gestate these preembryos should continue.
Id. at 602-03.
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decisions. Within this approach, problems inherent in determining
the timing of viability disappear. The woman is empowered to weigh
the morality and consequences of abortion for herself. Freedom of
speech guarantees that she will hear all sides of the debate over the
"right" and "wrong" of abortion. "The destiny of the woman must be
shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual
imperatives and her place in society."219 Just as the Davis decision
preserved Junior Davis' right not to procreate, a woman's right not to
procreate-whether through use of abortion or other means-must
be equally protected.
D. Gender Inequality in Abortion Laws
A final reason it is imperative that the Supreme Court apply Davis
to abortion cases is the sexual discrimination that results by not doing
so. When reading Davis alongside Casey, how can a reasonable court
not recognize a difference in reasoning based primarily on gender?
Laurence Tribe recognized the fundamental sexual discrimination
inherent in abortion restrictions:
[Although] current law nowhere forces men to sacrifice their bodies
and restructure their lives even in those tragic situations (of needed
organ transplants, for example) where nothing less will permit their
children to survive, those who would outlaw abortion [would] rely
[on] economic and physiological circumstances-the supposed
dictates of the natural-to conscript women [as] involuntary
incubators and thus to usurp a control over sexual activity and its
consequences that men [take] for granted.220
Recognizing this difference makes it unnecessary for the Court to
consider the moral ramifications of abortion, and leaves the decision
to the individual. "There have been few attempts at state intrusion of
the magnitude and sweeping nature involved in state regulation of
pregnant women's actions. " 221 At least one commentator goes so far
as to assert that if men could get pregnant, abortion would be an
unquestionable right.222
219. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992).
220. LAuRENcE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOIcEs 243 (1985); see alsoJudithJ. Thomson,
A Defense ofAbortion, 1 PHIL & PUB. Air. 47,48-49, 55-59 (1971) (comparing restrictions placed
on a woman's right to abort to the idea of forcing a healthy individual-through medical
advances which make it possible for a patient to "hook into" that individual's well-functioning
circulatory system-to save the life of another person). Thomson argues that the "right to life"
of the unborn does not extend as far as infringing upon another's rights to bodily integrity and
privacy in various medical contexts, including that of abortion. Id.
221. Johnsen, supra note 27, at 615.
222. See Smothers, supra note 109, at Al (commenting on the differential treatment of men's
and women's procreational autonomy).
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In response to this unequal treatment, women could attempt to
invoke Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees against
sexual discrimination in the abortion context.223 When two classes
of people are treated in a disparate manner by the law, the disadvan-
taged class may attempt to convince a court to engage in strict
scrutiny of that law.2
24
Heightened equal protection scrutiny2 by the courts is desirable
in the abortion context for three reasons. First, in spite of judicial
precedence to the contrary,226 women arguably comprise a "suspect
class" in the instant circumstances. Only women suffer from abortion
restrictions, because only women become pregnant and have
abortions.227  Fortunately, becoming pregnant can be a choice; but
some pregnancies are unforeseen and completely accidental,
regardless of what precautions may have been taken. Wonien can
avoid getting pregnant with certainty by avoiding heterosexual
intercourse altogether; however, that arguably requires extraordinary
self-denial, and it does not rule out pregnancy as a result of rape.
Unequal treatment of men and women in the abortion context is
due to reproductive differences. Abortion laws are not intended to
discriminate on the basis of gender; however, they do single out
pregnant people, and "[t]he ability to bear children is to sex
discrimination what dark skin is to race discrimination'!-an immuta-
223. See Catherine Grevers Schmidt, WherePrivacy Fails: Equal Protection and theAbortion Rights
of Minors, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 597,608-19 (1993) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is a more appropriate and secure means of preventing sex and
pregnancy discrimination than the traditional privacy-based analysis of reproductive freedom).
224. A state may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
225. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (upholding that laws discriminating on the
basis of gender must survive "intermediate scrutiny" by the courts). " [C]lassifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives." Id.; see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973)
(plurality opinion) (requiring the application of strict scrutiny where a classification based on
gender was the basis for differential treatment).
226. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (upholding, as constitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause, a program that prevented women with "normal" pregnancies-i.e., those
without health complications-from receiving disability benefits); Turic v. Holland Hospitality,
Inc., 849 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that pregnant women are not a "suspect
class" for purposes of an equal protection analysis). But see Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 114 S. Ct.
367, 373 n.* (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (asserting that "it remains an open question
whether 'classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect'" (citing Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982))).
227. Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. Rav. 1569, 1631 (1979)
(constructing an equal protection argument that claims prohibiting abortions forces women to
act as "good samaritans" and perform a "rescue" of the fetus, even when there is no legal duty
to rescue in other situations).
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ble characteristic. 228  However, Davis was a unique case because for
the first time, the unborn was out of the womb and was as much a
part of the father's body as the mother's.21 The court did not
hesitate to address the man's complaints concerning a potentially
intrusive, unwanted fatherhood.230
A second reason why equal protection is triggered in the abortion
context is that laws regulating abortion treat women differently than
men.2 1 The state exerts control over a pregnant woman's bodily
privacy in such a manner as never could be done to a man.23
2
Third, the history of discrimination against women in this coun-
try233 provides a stark reminder that intrusions upon a woman's
bodily integrity have been, and continue to be, ingrained in U.S. law.
Such historically accepted intrusions are not erased easily. In
addition, "the women who suffer most from prohibitions on abortion
are likely to be the same women who have suffered most from other
sorts of discrimination or injustice-poor women and career
women.
23
The court's reasoning in Davis equalizes, rather than divides, the
gender difference in the abortion context. However, Davis must not
lead to a preference of male rights over female rights when the
woman desires to continue the pregnancy and the man prefers an
abortion.235 The Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis judged the two
gamete-providers equally important in deciding which party would
decide the fate of the frozen embryos. 2 6 This is why the balancing
228. Johnsen, supra note 27, at 622 (arguing that immutable characteristics distinguish the
advantaged from the disadvantaged and, in the case of gender, are used to justify a system of
male dominance).
229. Davis v. Davis, C/A No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *58-60 (Tenn. Ct App.
Sept. 13, 1990).
230. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (recognizing that Mr. Davis would
suffer inordinately by being forced to become the biological father of a child with whom he
might not have an opportunity to develop a relationship).
231. Clearly, because men physically cannot become pregnant, they are neither affected in
the same way, nor to the same degree, by laws that impose limits on a woman's right to an
abortion.
232. The state, for instance, may find that, atviability, its interest in protecting potential life
outweighs the mother's privacy interest; yet a man would never have to face such a situation.
Likewise, a teenage boy will never be faced with the ordeal of securing parental consent to
obtain an abortion, whereas under Casey pregnant teenage girls would.
233. See Regan, supra note 227, at 1632 (arguing that discrimination is a contributing factor
in the application of heightened equal protection scrutiny to abortion laws).
234. Regan, supra note 227, at 1632 (hypothesizing that these two groups of women have
probably suffered more injustices than married women who tend to focus primarily on their
families).
235. SeeHarris, supra note 109, at 407 (describing this scenario); see also Smothers, supra note
109, at Al (observing that courts are now willing to compel a woman to have a child but have
decided a man cannot be forced to be a father).
236. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597, 601 (Tenn. 1992).
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test was applied to the issue.3 7 The court also judged the right to
procreate and the.right to prevent procreation equal."a "Ordinari-
ly, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming
that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parent-
hood by means other than use of the preembryos in question."23 9
At this point in history, male dominance over personal abortion
decisions is an unlikely outcome of U.S.jurisprudence. The Supreme
Court dislikes spousal consent laws that inconvenience abortion, and
has not hesitated to strike them down, even in Casey."
Davis fits nicely into the abortion context as a long-lost recognition
of a woman's right not to procreate, upholding the proper level of
heightened respect for women's rights to bodily privacy. The court
in Davis was able to draw an equal framework of procreational rights
simply because the other right implicated by abortion decisions-the
right to control one's own body-was not at stake.241 The object of
debate was in a neutral petri dish.242 That is why the man's interest
in Davis was given equal treatment. Otherwise, "a woman's stronger,
competing interest in controlling her body"243 should overshadow
procreational autonomy. Davis simply strengthens the importance of
the right not to procreate.
Interestingly, IVF and the subsequent destruction of embryos is
technically the only way that a man could "have an abortion." Legally
he cannot order his pregnant spouse or girlfriend to abort his child
in exercise of his right to prevent procreation, because that is a
choice deeply affecting the woman's own body."4 However, because
cryopreserved fertilized embryos lie in a petri dish until implantation
237. See id. at 601 (noting that men's and women's reproductive freedom are of equal
importance, especially in the IVF process).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 604.
240. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2826-31 (1992)
(holding a husband's interest in the fetus' potential life does not grant him authority over his
wife); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-71 (1976) (concluding
that the state does not have the constitutional authority to give the spouse unilateral power to
prohibit his wife from obtaining an abortion). For other courts' treatment of spousal consent
requirements, see also Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 794-96 (5th Cir. 1975) (deciding the
spouse's interest in the fetus does not outweigh the woman's fundamental rights); Wolfe v.
Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631, 636-37 (W.D. Ky. 1974) (stressing that, because the state cannot
itself interfere to protect the fetus before viability, it cannot intercede on a husband's behalf
either); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 193 (D. Utah 1973) (holding two statutes invalid that
required a woman seeking an abortion to obtain third party consent).
241. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601 (discussing how concerns about a woman's bodily integrity that
usually preclude men from abortion decisions are not applicable in the context of IVF).
242. Id. at 591.
243. Note, supra note 2, at 1544-45 (emphasis added); see also Danforith 428 U.S. at 69-75
(upholding a woman's right to have an abortion free from spousal interference).
244. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 70.
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in the woman's womb,24 a man can choose to destroy them just as
a woman may choose to have an abortion. The court in Davis stated
that in IVF, "[n] one of the concerns about a woman's bodily integrity
that have previously precluded men from controlling abortion
decisions is applicable here." 46 Does that not mean that in abor-
tion cases, the woman should be afforded even higher procreational
autonomy, because her bodily integrity is at stake?247
One commentator has insisted that "[t] he rationales of Roe v. Wade
and Webster [do] not apply to an analysis of the status of a frozen
embryo because the embryo is outside the woman's body and does
not interfere with her right of privacy."248  On the contrary, both
Davis and the abortion cases implicate the right to privacy as
embodied in the right to procreational autonomy, which is unrelated
to whether the egg is growing in the woman's body, or preserved in
a petri dish. Potential life is potential life; the decision to become a
parent resides with both parents, or at least with the mother contem-
plating abortion.
V. CONCLUSION
The state's interest in protecting potential life is important, but not
sufficiently compelling, in abortion decisions.249 There is an inher-
ent conflict between a woman's fundamental right to be free from
state-mandated "serious physical invasion," and the movement to
endow the fetus with legal rights similar to those enjoyed by born per-
sons." ° Recognizing a fundamental right not to procreate does not
mean necessarily that all pregnant women will rush out and exercise
their newly-clarified right by obtaining an abortion. By the same
token, neither does stripping a woman of her right to have an
abortion mean that abortion will disappear completely or no longer
serve as an alternative to contraception.251
245. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
246. Id. at 601.
247. See generally Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52 (discussing the competing interests of men and
women concerning the issue of spousal consent forms).
248. Davis, supra note 200, at 514.
249. Regan, supra note 227, at 1634-35 (arguing that the primary justification for laws
regulating abortion is the protection of potential human life, which nonetheless cannot compare
with a woman's interest in non-subordination and freedom from physical invasion).
250. Regan, supranote 227, at 1635 (discussing the "inequality between pregnant women and
the treatment of other potential [good] samaritans who are not required to undertake
burdens[,]" and how this inequality disadvantages a class that has long suffered a history of
discrimination).
251. See generally Martha I. Morgan, Founding Mothers: Women's Voices and Stories in the 1987
Nicaraguan Constitution, 70 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1990); Mark Savage, The Law of Abortion in the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Peoples Republic of China: Women's Rights in Two Socialist
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Why do courts attempt to differentiate a woman's right to choose
abortion based upon different stages of fetal embryonic development
when various scientific findings indicate different stages at which "life
begins"? Four different experts testified at the Davis trial, presenting
four different opinions on the point at which life begins, all scientifi-
cally supported. Many argue that the difference between preembryos,
embryos, and fetuses should control in abortion cases. But these
arguments are so muddied that they blur the reality of the law: no
"person" is protected by the law until they are born, except in recent
abortion cases.252
Who can dispute that at a very early stage, genetics dictate what
characteristics a baby will display once it is born? Who can dispute
that by a certain stage during pregnancy, a fetus could survive outside
its mother's uterus with the aid of technological machinery? But why
should these possibilities preempt a woman's fundamental, constitu-
tional right to procreate-or not?
Use of the Tennessee Supreme Court's analysis in Davis of a
person's right not to procreate within the abortion context under-
scores the reality that it is the person who is relevant in law, not some
amorphous concept of life. Life surrounds all "persons" on a daily
basis, but at times the quality of that life is paid no more respect than
if it were a fly squashed by a newspaper. It is imperative that the law
not confuse the issues: "viable fetuses in the womb are not entitled
to the same protection as 'persons'. " "
Countries, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1988); BrianJ. Leslie, Note, Poland, Abortion, and the Roman
Catholic Church, 17 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 453 (1994). As the above-cited articles discuss,
high numbers of abortions are nevertheless performed in countries where abortion is illegal, as
women seek to terminate unwanted pregnancies regardless of the consequences.
252. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818 (1992)
(rejecting the trimester framework of Roe as undervaluing the state's interest in potential life
and concentrating on the rights of the fetus). Casey is an example of a recent abortion case that
illustrates the Court's increased discussion of the fetus' rights, as compared with its limited
discussion of fetal rights in older cases, such as Roe
253. Davis v. Davis, C/A No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.
13, 1990).

